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Abstract
It is an open question in antitrust economics whether allowing dominant firms to
acquire smaller rivals is ultimately helpful or harmful to the long run rate of innova-
tion and therefore long-term consumer welfare. I develop a framework to study this
question in a dynamic oligopoly model where firms endogenously investment, entry,
exit and engage in mergers. Firms produce vertically differentiated goods, compete by
innovating on product quality, and can acquire rival firms to gain market power. In a
benchmark model, mergers are modeled to be exclusively harmful to consumers in the
short run by reducing competition and increasing prices. Despite this, under standard
industry settings it is possible to show that the prospect of a buyout creates a powerful
incentive for firms to preemptively enter the industry and invest to make themselves
an attractive merger partner. The result is significantly higher rate of innovation with
mergers than without and significantly higher long-run consumer welfare as well. Fur-
ther results explore the circumstances under which this result is likely to hold. In order
for the long run increase in innovation to outweigh the short run harm to consumers
caused by mergers, entry costs must be low, entrants and incumbents must both have
the ability to innovate rapidly, and the degree of horizontal product differentiation
must be low. Alternatively, when dominant firms can directly incorporate the acquired
firm’s innovation into their own product, mergers will typically benefit consumers in
both the short run and long run.
1 Introduction
In a concentrated industry, does allowing rival firms to merge increase or decrease invest-
ment and innovation? When is there a net positive effect on innovation from allowing dom-
inant firms to acquire new entrants and smaller rivals? Antitrust authorities increasingly
deal with industries characterized by high levels of investment and where innovations cause
rapid changes in firm market share and product quality.1 For these industries, the effects of
a merger on dynamic considerations such as investment, entry and exit are more important
than the standard considerations of market power and price increases when determining
the merger’s likely effect on consumer welfare. In industries characterized by multi-sided
platforms, traditional price effects may be absent altogether and a merger’s effect on inno-
vation incentives is especially important. The relationship between industry concentration
and innovation is itself complex and non-monotonic.2 Furthermore, few things matter more
for consumer welfare than the long run rate of innovation, and the factors that determine
firm decisions to develop and produce improvements in product quality occupy a central role
in economics and marketing.3 Despite this, the relationship between mergers and product
innovation remains poorly understood.
Mergers may affect investment incentives in a number of competing ways. Investment
typically imposes a negative externality on the industry, as some portion of the gains from
a successful innovation come from stealing business from rival firms. By merging, firms
will internalize this effect and reduce their investment accordingly.4 Firms may also buy
out a smaller rival to acquire its new innovation, and so use the merger as a substitute for
investing in the new technology itself.5 On the other hand, the prospect of being bought
out by an incumbent with deep pockets may also encourage entry into the market by new
firms, encouraging development of new products and technologies. Some new start-ups in
1Katz and Shelanski (2006) and Gilbert (2006) discuss the increasing importance of innovation in merger
analysis. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines introduced a section dealing with innovation, and in the
years 2013-2015, the Department of Justice challenged mergers in part due to concerns about innovation
incentives in online platforms, online display advertising, chemicals, computer cir cuits, aircraft components
and beer. For more see the Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in the United States for
those years, jointly produced by the DOJ and FTC.
2A long literature in economics considers this topic. Notably, Aghion et al. (2005) has shown a inverted-U
shaped relationship between industry concentration and innovation.
3Hauser et al. (2006) identify innovation as “one of the most important issues in business research today.”
4This internalization effect is closely related to the notion of innovation markets developed by Gilbert
and Sunshine (1995).
5This has been cited as a particularly important issue in recent pharmaceutical mergers. A notable
example is the Merck purchase of Idenix in 2014.
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technological and pharmaceutical industries explicitly cite a potential future acquisition as
an “exit strategy” when seeking early funding. A merger may also increase the new firm’s
ability to innovate via economies of scale or complementarities between the two firms’ R&D
capabilities. Because the relationship between mergers and innovation depends in a complex
way on both pre and post-merger market structure, to determine the interplay between and
relative importance of these effects requires modeling industry dynamics such as entry and
investment along with endogenous mergers.
Empirical work on this question is limited and faces several challenges.6 Instead, this
paper presents a model of a concentrated industry with fully endogenous entry, exit, quality
investment and horizontal mergers. Including each of these features is necessary in order to
consider questions regarding innovation, which is inherently dynamic.7 I solve this model
for a broad range of industry features to show under what conditions mergers will increase
or decrease innovation, and in particular under what circumstances will dynamic effects
outweigh static harms that might arise under mergers.
I find that even in a setting where mergers exclusively increase prices and harm consumer
welfare in the short term, it can commonly occur that the ultimate long-term effect of
allowing these anti-competitive mergers is much higher average consumer welfare. This is
because those mergers can generate a new type of preemptive or speculative entry which
increases the total amount of competition and investment taking place. I then explore
what mechanisms drive this result and what industry characteristics make it likely to occur.
For the long-term effects on innovation to outweigh the immediate harms from reduced
competition, the primary conditions are that entry costs must be relatively low and both
new entrants and dominant firms must be capable of generating rapid innovations. I also
find that when the dominant firm can directly incorporate the acquired firm’s innovation
6Mergers are frequently a response to a larger shock to technology, preferences or regulations that would
cause firms or the entire industry to expand or contract in the absence of a merger Harford (2005), for in-
stance, shows that industry level merger waves are primarily driven by “economic, regulatory or technological
shocks.” In addition, mergers strongly cluster over time and industries, and both the decision to merge and
the decision to invest have strong strategic components that depend on rivals’ actions. These factors make
finding causal evidence from pre and post-merger R&D levels very difficult. Even if a plausible instrument
could be found, it is unlikely the effects of mergers induced by this instrument would be generalizable to
other settings. See Nevo and Winston (2010) for more on this point. Recent attempts have been made to
estimate structural models of merger dynamics, including Jeziorski (2014) in the radio industry, Igami and
Uetake (2015) the hard disk drive industry, Nishida and Yang (2014) in retail, and Stahl (2016) in broadcast
television.
7Gowrisankaran (1999a) discusses the challenges of solving a dynamic model with endogenous mergers
and presents a lengthy discussion of the flaws inherent in static models and models of exogenously imposed
mergers.
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into its own product quality, mergers are especially beneficial. Finally, mergers are more
likely to increase long-term welfare when horizontal product differentiation is low and firms
mostly compete on quality.
Despite the importance of the dynamic effects of horizontal mergers, they have rarely
been studied in settings where mergers occur endogenously.8 Endogeneity of mergers is
crucial to understand their dynamic effects because today’s decisions regarding entry, exit,
investment, and mergers are affected by the possibility of future mergers. That mergers
occur in waves within industries is well documented. Only a few studies have been done
where mergers arise endogenously in a dynamic context.9 Pesendorfer (2005) derives the-
oretical predictions from a Cournot model with entry, exit and mergers and finds that the
standard Cournot result is overturned if firms expect the possibility of mergers in the future.
Gowrisankaran (1999a) presents a framework for studying mergers in a dynamic oligopoly
with capacity-constrained, homogenous goods producers.
Recently, Mermelstein et al. (2018) develop a model of investment and mergers in a
homogenous good model where investment lowers production costs. They find mergers
decrease long term consumer surplus as well as incumbent profits, but that antitrust policy
can increase aggregate value. Along with the different modeling choices described above and
the different focus on innovation, I find very different results on the relationship between
mergers and consumer welfare. Despite both involving investment, building physical capital
and investing in innovations to improve product quality are quite distinct and interact with
mergers distinctly as well.
Following this work by Mermelstein et al. (2018), I adopt a similar investment technol-
ogy, described in more detail below, but study a model with a number of features that are
better suited to the study of industries where innovation is of first order concern such as
software, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and other tech hardware, telecoms, etc. In so
8Cheong and Judd (2006) and Chen (2009) present numerical results showing that the welfare conclusions
of static models can be overturned in the long run. Cheong and Judd (2006) show that even in Cournot
type industries mergers may be profitable in present value terms. Each of these consider only exogenous
mergers.
9Federico et al. (2017) and Federico et al. (2018) study this question in a simple two-stage model. They
find that mergers reduce the incentives to innovate for the merging firms, as they internalize the business
stealing externality associated with innovation. This effect outweighs the increase in innovation brought
about by higher post-merger profits due to the reduction in product market competition. The model does
not allow for post-merger entry by new firms that may ameliorate this second effect and mergers always
make consumers worse off. Similarly, Motta and Tarantino (2017) studies both quality-enhancing and cost-
reducing investment incentives in a two-stage model without entry and find that mergers harm consumers
if there are no corresponding efficiency gains.
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doing, I develop a framework which can be used to consider a variety of questions regard-
ing how mergers affect innovation and product quality decisions. First, instead of firms
producing homogenous goods and competing by setting quantity, firms produce vertically
differentiated goods and compete in prices. This distinction is significant both because it is
in differentiated goods settings where we are most concerned with innovation and because in
this setting entry-for-buyout can be efficient as well as beneficial to consumers, whereas in
homogenous goods settings it is typically inefficient. Second, the role of mergers is not to re-
duce production costs but to improve overall product quality. Finally, I alter the investment
technology to allow for an endogenous and variable long run rate of innovation.
I proceed by embedding an endogenous merger stage game into an Ericson-Pakes style
dynamic oligopoly model where firms produce differentiated goods and compete in prices.
They engage in entry, exit, and invest in future product quality. In each period firms may
enter merger negotiations with one another. If the firms merge, the acquired firm no longer
exists in the industry. In some specifications, I explore allowing the merging firms to combine
their products to form a new, higher-quality product. This model represents an increase
in generality over previous attempts to model the dynamic effects of mergers, while also
extending the setting to differentiated goods and an endogenous rate of innovation.
I take advantage of two recent methodological advances necessary to approach this topic.
First, I follow Goettler and Gordon (2014) in modifying the Pakes and McGuire (1994)
framework to allow for a long run rate of innovation that is endogenous. Second, I adapt
the investment framework of Mermelstein et al. (2018), which allows for rich and flexible
investment patterns. I then solve numerically for a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
in pure strategies for a range of model parameters and industry features. An additional
contribution of this paper is a proposed modification the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and
McGuire (2001) that substantially improves stability and performance, which is used to
solve and simulate the model.
In a baseline model with no mergers allowed, the equilibrium outcome is an industry
that exists primarily in a state of duopoly with one firm producing a high quality product
and another offering an inferior product and investing little. When mergers are allowed,
they frequently arise. In this benchmark case, these mergers reduce competition, remove
a product from the market, and offer no cost efficiencies. They are therefore exclusively
harmful to consumers. But when they are allowed there is substantially greater entry,
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including by firms who enter in states where their static profits are negative because the
prospect of a buyout is so lucrative. These new entrants then invest in their products and
occasionally become rivals to the leading firm. This competition benefits consumers directly
but also spurs greater investment overall, leading to a significantly higher rate of long-term
innovation. As a result the rate of innovation is dramatically higher than in a setting without
mergers. Thus it is possible that allowing for mergers, even when they offer no direct benefit
to consumers, can result is greater consumer welfare by increasing the rate of innovation.
Next I vary model parameters and features to determine what industry characteristics
make this result more or less likely. First, because preemptive entry is the factor generating
the main result, I explore how equilibrium outcomes vary both with and without mergers
as entry costs rise from low to high. I find that with low entry costs mergers generate
sufficiently higher entry and innovation to improve consumer surplus, but with higher entry
costs this effect reverses. Consumers are harmed by mergers in the short run and while
entrants eventually replace the acquired firms, preemptive entry for the prospect of a buyout
disappears and the net effect of mergers is harm to consumers. The role of entry costs in
allowing for preemptive entry-for-buyout is distinct from their role in allowing post-merger
replacement entry discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Second, I vary the ability of both new entrants and incumbent firms to generate large
innovations. I first vary the maximum product quality that entrants are able to achieve and
then vary the amount by which incumbents are able to improve their product quality in a
single period. These tests show that the main result that mergers increase consumer welfare
depends first on the ability of entrants to enter with at least a moderate product quality.
If firms can only enter the industry at the very bottom of the quality ladder, the dynamics
described above will generally not occur and mergers remain mostly harmful. Similarly, if
incumbents lack the ability to generate large improvements in quality, the scope for mergers
to increase long-term innovation is limited. In the case when firms can only advance their
product quality by one unit in a period there is no innovation and mergers are only harmful.
In practice, these feature can be observed by policymakers by considering relative rates of
patent filings, product life-cycles, and the underlying technology.
Next, I explore synergistic mergers in which the two merging firms can combine some
share of their products and form a higher quality product. This case may be especially
relevant in tech settings in which dominant firms compete by offering a large number of
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“verticals” in one platform. A new entrant might develop a related vertical that competes
indirectly with the dominant firm. The dominant firm thus has a choice of investing to try
and incorporate those same features into its platform or to buy out the new firm directly to
do so. In this case consumers might benefit from the combination of the two products but
be harmed by the loss of a nascent competitor. In addition, this type of merger might be
especially likely to generate entrants who wish to get bought out, because the buyout value
is substantially higher when products can be combined. I find that as merger “synergies”
increase, this indeed does occur and consumer welfare is substantially higher. The greater
the degree of synergy is between firms the more likely this type of merger is to generate
additional innovation.
Finally, I examine the role of horizontal product differentiation. This represents the
degree to which firms who successfully innovate can capture higher market share as a result,
and can be thought of as analogous to “contestability,” as described by Shapiro (2010).10
When there is a high degree of horizontal product differentiation, a successful innovation
on product quality translates into a smaller incremental increase in sales. I show that
when horizontal product differentiation is low mergers increase long-run consumer surplus
by increasing innovation. When this is high, however, this is no longer true.
This paper also helps address the larger question of what is the relationship between
competition and innovation?11 Theoretical work on this question has a long and rich history
in industrial organization, with economists offering varying opinions for why innovation
should be higher under more monopolistic or competitive industries. In recent work, Aghion
et al. (2005), suggests an inverted-U shaped relationship with low rates of innovation in
highly competitive and monopolistic settings, and high innovation in intermediate settings.
Goettler and Gordon (2014) find a similar result. Marshall and Parra (2016) extend patent
race models to show what features of product market competition lead to positive and
negative relationships between competition and innovation. Segal and Whinston (2007)
contribute to this literature by showing in a general model that antitrust policy that protects
entrant profits leads to higher innovation. They demonstrate this result for competition
policy related to exclusive contracts and network externalities, I show a result for horizontal
mergers that is contradictory in the sense that stricter antitrust policy would slow innovation,
10Specifically, Shapiro (2010) uses the definition “The prospect of gaining or protecting profitable sales by
providing greater value to customers.”
11Shapiro (2010) calls this “arguably the most important question in the field of industrial organization.”
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but via a complementary mechanism. In this case, while mergers are anti-competitive, they
increase the value of entry by allowing for potentially lucrative buyouts of small firms.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows, section 2 describes the model environ-
ment and lays out the nature of mergers and investment, section 3 describes the nature of
equilibrium and method of computation, section 4 presents benchmark results on the static
and long-term effects of mergers and section 5 explores how these results vary over a range
of different assumptions and parameter values.
2 Model
In this section I present a model of competition between a small number of potentially
long-lived firms who invest in order to increase their product qualities. Industry dynamics
are based on the Ericson and Pakes (1995) quality ladder framework, in which a set of
firms invest, enter, and exit endogenously in discrete time with an infinite horizon. This
model and its properties and many applications are reviewed at length in Doraszelski and
Pakes (2008), and will be given a shorter treatment here with more emphasis on the model’s
novel elements. In the model, a set of constant marginal cost firms produce differentiated
goods and compete in prices. The goods differ with respect to their level of quality and
firms can invest in future product quality using a stochastic R&D technology described at
length below. The long run rate of innovation in equilibrium is endogenous. Here and
throughout, innovation refers to an increase in the technological frontier or an increase in
product quality beyond what has been available before. Each period, firms are allowed to
enter merger negotiations with any other firm following a random sequence. Firms will
attempt to merge if the net gain to the acquiring firm is greater than the reservation value
of the acquired firm. In some specifications that follow, mergers are quality-increasing, in
that the merger results in a new, higher quality product.
2.1 Incumbent Firms
Product Market Competition At any given time there are n ≤ n firms active in the
market, each producing a good with a quality level denoted by ωi ∈ {ω1, ..., ωmax}. This
“quality” can be thought of broadly, including as a function over a bundle of characteristics.
For instance, the quality of a wireless company’s product is a function of the size and quality
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of its coverage network, the quality and variety of handsets, the retail distribution network,
etc. The set of firms’ qualities will be referred to collectively as Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn}. This is
public information and the set of n quality levels represents the state of the industry. When
n < n, the state vector Ω contains zeroes to indicate the market is not full.
Consumer preferences are represented by u(·), where consumer k’s utility from good i
is given by uk,i = ωi + log(y − pi) + k,i, where y is income and i,k represents consumers’
differing tastes. Each consumer will purchase one unit of the product that gives them the
highest utility. They can instead purchase an “outside option” whose utility is normalized to
0. Following the work of McFadden (1974), if  is drawn from an extreme value distribution
with dispersion parameter φ, the result of consumer choices is a demand curve represented
by the logit demand system:
qi(p1, ...pn; Ω) = M
exp(φ−1 (ωi + log(y − pi)))
1 +
∑
j exp(φ
−1
 (ωj + log(y − pj))))
(1)
where qi(·) is firm i’s demand and M is the size of the market, or the total measure of
consumers. In this setting, φ can be thought of as the degree of horizontal differentiation
in consumer preferences, such that an increase in φ translates into a higher market share
for the highest quality product in the market. Firms face symmetric marginal costs mc
and choose prices conditional on the set of goods in the market to maximize profits, which
follows from consumer demand such that:
pi(pi, p−i) = qi(p1, ..., pn; Ω)(pi −mc) (2)
2.2 Investment
In each period firms can invest by paying a cost in the hope of increasing their product
quality. All firms have access to the same stochastic R&D technology. This technology
follows recent work by Mermelstein, Nocke, Satterthwaite and Whinston (2014) (hereafter
MNS&W.) The technology is stochastic in that investment costs vary across firms and time,
but after the cost is paid product quality improvement is deterministic.
Let each firm’s current quality level ωi take an integer value. Firm i then draws a set of
investment costs {cj}ωij=1 ∈ [c, c] for each unit that makes up ωi. This is the cost of upgrading
that unit by 1. MNS&W refer to this technology as capital augmentation although in this
9
context it might better be thought of as quality augmentation. In addition, firms draw
another cost, which MNS&W refer to as a greenfield cost, from some distribution [c, cg].
This determines the cost of product improvement for investment levels above ωi. Therefore,
if they pay a high enough cost any firm can reach any greater state in each period. Because
they get more cost draws, firms with higher quality products are more likely on average to
get low cost draws for the same amount of innovation.
This investment technology produces several desirable features. First, for a given unit
of innovation, larger firms are more efficient in the sense that they are more likely to receive
a low cost draw because they will have more opportunities. Second, within a firm there
are decreasing returns in the sense that each additional unit of investment will come at an
increasing cost. Both of these patterns are consistent with the empirical literature on R&D
and firm scale, which Cohen (2010) in a review article summarizes as follows: “Thus, the
robust empirical patterns relating to R&D and innovation to firm size are that R&D increases
monotonically- and typically proportionately- with firm size among R&D performers within
industries, the number of innovations tends to increase less than proportionately than firm
size, and the share of R&D effort dedicated to more incremental and process innovation
tends to increase with firm size.”
In addition, as noted by MNS&W, in the widely used Pakes and McGuire (1994) dynamic
oligopoly framework mergers reduce the number of firms and thus the number of firms who
can invest. Mergers will then directly reduce the industry-wide investment possibility set.
In the MNS&W framework, the set of possible investments and investment costs are purely
a function of a firm’s current state ωi. Thus, when firms merge and combine products, this
action does not necessarily reduce the total set of possible investments. If the new state is
ω′i = ωi + ωj , the firm’s investment problem is unchanged from the combined pre-merger
problems of both firms, except that the business stealing externality has been internalized.
This is useful for examining the relationship between mergers and innovation, since the
standard model mechanically generates a negative relationship.
Long Run Rate of Innovation
In addition to the endogenous improvements in product quality generated by firm in-
vestment, the outside good in the model also exogenously improves in quality over time.
This is a standard feature of the Pakes and McGuire (1994) framework. Another standard
feature is to bound the profit function above a certain level, so that firms have no incentive
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to invest increasing amounts and increase their product quality more and more relative to
the outside good. If they did so the state space would become unbounded and the model
would become intractable. But a bounded profit function indirectly serves to exogenously
cap the long-run rate of innovation at the rate at which the outside good’s quality improves.
This happens at rate δ, meaning the outside good’s quality improves by 1 unit in each period
with probability δ, which is equivalent to reducing all firms product qualities by 1.
To study the effects of mergers on long-run innovation, however, we need the rate of
innovation to be endogenous. But if this endogenous long-term rate of innovation exceeds
δ, the set of potential good qualities Ω becomes unbounded. To avoid the problems this
would imply, I follow Goettler and Gordon (2014) in modifying the profit function and the
treatment of the state space. Denote ωmax as the industry frontier. If in any period a
firm innovates or merges to achieve a quality level ω′i > ωmax, the result is that all firms
experience a downward shock equal to ω′i − ωmax. At the same time successful innovation
generates a spillover effect on the outside good, which increases by the amount by which
the innovation increased the quality frontier. The quality frontier can thus be thought of
as the maximum amount by which a firm can innovate before knowledge spillovers cause
the outside good or a newly entering firm to benefit from the leading firms innovation.
This keeps the frontier firm at level ωmax and preserves the relative differences between
the product qualities of all active firms. Because only these relative differences matter for
profits, this does not affect firm behavior or equilibrium outcomes. This modification keeps
the problem tractable while allowing the innovation rate to be endogenous.
From the perspective of consumers, it is the absolute level of product quality that mat-
ters and not just the value relative to the outside good. An increase in the quality frontier
generates additional consumer surplus in the current period but also in all future periods.
I follow Goettler and Gordon (2011) in adjusting for this when calculating per-period con-
sumer surplus. If a firm innovates such that ω′i > ωmax, consumer welfare therefore increases
by ω
′
i−ωmax
1−β .
Firms also face a flat, fixed operating cost FC that must be paid each period and receive a
private, random scrap value upon exit, drawn from some distribution F (·). In the beginning
of each period, after observing investment costs {c1, ..., cω}, firms choose whether to remain
in business and pay FC or exit and receive the scrap value. They then choose investment
level xi ∈ {0, ..., ωmax}.
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2.3 Merger Stage
Multiplicity and Proposal Order: The bulk of previous research studying the impli-
cations of horizontal mergers has examined the results of exogenously imposed mergers.
Although studying the pattern of mergers that would arise endogenously has clear bene-
fits, modeling endogenous mergers poses a challenge. In many industries there may exist a
set of profitable but mutually exclusive merger arrangements. Two large firms might each
benefit from buying a smaller rival, for instance, but only one can do so. The mergers in
this set represent multiple equilibria and there needs to be a clear equilibrium selection
mechanism. One solution to this problem is to model the merger stage as a non-cooperative
game, where firms propose buyout offers according to a defined sequence that provides a
unique equilibrium in each stage.
Gowrisankaran (1999a) follows this approach, embedding in an Ericson-Pakes model a
stage game wherein the largest firm acts first. It has the ability to propose a merger to
any other firm. If it chooses not to the second largest firm may propose, and so on. I use
a similar stage game although I allow the sequence by which firms propose mergers to be
random. While this adds to the difficulty of solving the model, it should result in a richer
pattern of outcomes.
At the beginning of each period, a firm is randomly chosen and allowed to enter merger
negotiations with any other firm. In the benchmark case, the acquired firm receives a
buyout and exits the industry. In an alternative specification explored in section 5.2 firms
who merge can partially combine their product qualities to a degree determined by the
amount of “synergy,” represented by a parameter σ. In this case, in the period following the
merger, the new, combined firm will produce a product of quality ω′ = σ(ωB + ωS), where
subscripts indicate the buyer and seller. The degree of synergy might reflect the amount of
overlap between the two firms’ products pre-merger. The realism of this assumption and
what industry settings are likely to exhibit merger synergies are discussed in section 5.2.
In the benchmark case with no synergies, mergers therefore can only harm consumers
in a static sense. This is because the number of products available is reduced, competition
is reduced, and there are no cost efficiencies that accompany the merger. This modeling
choice is intentional, since mergers with large efficiency gains that increase static welfare are
uncontroversial regardless of their effects on innovation.
During the merger stage firms are fully forward-looking. Each firm observes all potential
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merger partners at the beginning of the period and all firms observe the randomized sequence
in which merger proposals may occur. The proposing firm will either propose a merger with
the firm offering the highest return in the merger stage or pass on the option. If the firm
passes, a new firm is chosen at random and given the opportunity to offer a merger. The
process continues until all firms have had an opportunity or a merger occurs. Each firm
therefore receives at most 1 chance to propose a merger. Because firms know that if they
refuse a buyout offer they may be the next firm with the power to propose a merger, they
may have the incentive to turn down a profitable merger foreseeing another, more profitable
merger with some other firm. Similarly, they may accept or propose a less valuable merger
to prevent two other firms in the market from merging and becoming too powerful.
Merger Surplus and Buyout Cost:
To evaluate a possible acquisition, firms consider the potential surplus that would result
from a merger. The merger’s surplus is the difference between the combined firm’s present
discounted value and the sum of the separate firms’ values if they remain independent and
the process proceeds. If there is a positive surplus from the firms’ merger, it will be split
between the two parties. This split results from Nash bargaining where the reservation price
of the firm being acquired is its value if the negotiation fails.12 The value to the acquiring
firm is the difference in values between the combined firm and its value if negotiations
fail. Let V B(·) and V S(·) be the values of the buyer and the seller at the beginning of the
following period at market structure Ω, which are described in greater detail in the following
section, and let mij indicate whether or not a merger was agreed to by both parties, with 1
meaning it was. The size of the buyout offer τijsolves:
max
τij
(
V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− τij − V B(Ω′|mij = 0)
)ρb(
τij − V S(Ω′|mij = 0)
)ρs
(3)
where ρb and ρs represent buyer and seller bargaining power parameters. The result is a
payment equal to
12One reason previous papers have resisted considering dynamic models of mergers in industries with
more than 2 firms is that there is no fully satisfactory solution to the bargaining problem merging firms
must solve due to the fact that there is a positive externality being conferred on the non-merging firm. I
use the bilateral Nash bargaining outcome, effectively ignoring the effect of the merger on the non-merging
firm. The externality still effects outcomes however, as firms might strategically wait or turn down a merger
opportunity in cases where they would benefit more from their two rivals merging.
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τij = ρbV
S(Ω′|mij = 0) + ρs[V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− V B(Ω′|mij = 0)] (4)
Because ρs = 1− ρb by definition, this can equivalently be written as
τij = V
S(Ω′|mij = 0) + ρs[V B(Ω′|mij = 1)− V B(Ω′|mij = 0)− V S(Ω′|mij = 0)] (5)
The first term is the reservation value of the seller and the second term is the share of the
surplus from the buyer that is paid out. Finally, when a merger agreement is reached, the
acquiring firm pays a fixed merger cost cM .
2.4 Potential Entrants
In each period, a single firm may enter the market. The potential entrant lives for a single
period and must pay an entry cost cei to join the industry, becoming an incumbent and
competing in the product market in the following period. The timing of the model is such
that potential entrants make their entry and investment decision at the beginning of the
period, simultaneous with incumbent firms making their exit and investment decisions.
In addition to their entry cost, potential entrants face the same investment cost function
as incumbents, but where greenfield costs begin at ωmax, the same set of potential costs as
a firm at the industry frontier. The investment technology allows entrants to innovate up
to any possible ω level if they were to receive a sufficiently favorable set of cost draws. This
assumption is meant to capture the fact that potential entrants’ activities are focused entirely
on developing their product quality, resulting in them facing temporarily lower investment
costs on top of their general entry cost. Once they enter and become incumbents, they face
the same investment costs as all other incumbents.
Modeling entrant investment as coming from a favorable set of cost draws can also be
thought of as a “reduced form” version of a model with multiple potential entrants competing
to enter the industry, and where the entrant with the lowest investment cost or best product
quality ultimately wins the right to enter. While this assumption is used in the benchmark
case explored in the model, Section 5 also shows results over a range of entry costs and a
range of entrant investment capabilities.
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2.5 Timing
1. Incumbent firms observe investment costs and potential entrants observe entry costs.
2. Incumbents choose whether or not to exit, their investment level if continuing, and
entrants decide to enter or not and at what quality level. Their product qualities
adjust as a result.
3. Firms enter the merger stage:
(a) All firms observe a randomly chosen sequence that governs the order in which
they may propose mergers.
(b) Firm i selects its most profitable potential partner, and if both firms find the
merger profitable relative to the option value of allowing the next firm to propose,
the two firms agree to merge.
(c) If no merger is agreed to in step (b), the merger stage repeats until either all
firms have had a chance to propose mergers or an agreement occurs.
4. If a merger agreement was reached, firm i pays τij to firm j who exits.
5. Firms compete and earn profits pi(Ω′)
3 Equilibrium and Computation
3.1 Firm Policies
In this section I formally describe firm policies over entry, exit, investment and mergers as
well as the value functions associated with those policies. I then describe the conditions for
a symmetric, Markov perfect equilibrium and the computational algorithm for finding it.
Incumbent exit and investment policies: At the beginning of a period, for a given
state Ω = {ω1, ..., ωn}, there exist a set of incumbents and a potential entrant. Denote
as V (ωi, ω−i) the value of being an incumbent in state ωi with rivals in states ω−i at the
beginning of a the period, before any cost shocks have been observed and before entry, exit,
and investment decisions are made. Denote as V E(Ω, cei) the value of being a potential
entrant in state Ω after drawing an entry cost cei.
15
Each incumbent then draws a set of investment costs equal in number to their product
quality ω, which takes an integer value. For simplicity, I will describe this process in terms
of one representative firm. Firm i with product quality ωi takes ωi draws uniformly from
the distribution [c, c]. In addition they draw a greenfield cost from the distribution [c, cg].
Let VM (ωi, ω−i) represent the interim value of being in state ωi while your rivals have
states ω−i after entry, exit, and investment have taken place but before the merger stage
game plays out and VM (ωi, ω−i, i, j) as the value conditional on the proposer being firm i.
After observing its set of cost draws c˜i, firm i chooses its exit policy χEX ∈ {0, 1} and, if
not exiting, the amount of investment to undertake xi ∈ {0, ..., ωmax}. Simultaneously, the
industry-wide depreciation shock η ∈ {0, 1} is realized, taking value 1 with probability δ.
After investing at level xi, a firm’s state updates to ω′i = ωi + xi − η. The firm therefore
solves:
max
xi
{−FC − C(c˜i, xi) + β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
VM (ωi + xi − η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)} (6)
Where h(·|·) represents beliefs over rival firms investment outcomes, including potential
entry and exit. Let x∗i represent the solution to this problem. The firm draws a random
private scrap value φ and exits and χEX = 1 if
−C(c˜i, x∗i ) + β
∑
η
∑
ω−i V
M (ωi + x
∗
i − η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i) < FC + φ.
The investment level x∗i is determined by equating the marginal cost of an additional unit
of investment to the increase in the expected value upon reaching the merger stage.
The potential entrant’s problem is very similar to that of an incumbent. After observing
its entry cost, it chooses its entry policy χE ∈ {0, 1} and then, if entering, draws ωmax
investment cost draws from the distribution [c, c]. It then decides whether or not to enter
based on the expected value of pursuing the optimal level of investment. Consequently, the
product quality of the entrant is endogenous and can take any value in {1, ..., ωmax}.
Mergers: When deciding whether or not to propose a merger with another firm, firm
i must evaluate a set of potential future outcomes. In evaluating whether to propose a
current merger, each firm will form expectations over the distribution of future states if
they do not propose a merger. They must consider the probability that there is a merger
between other firms, which occurs with probability
∑
k
∑
j Q(mjk|Ω) where mjk represents
a merger between firms k and j. This probability represents the joint probability that firms
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k or j are next to propose a merger.
If firm i is the proposing firm, they choose:
max
{
max
j
{−τij(ωi, ω−i)− cM + pi(ωi, ω−i|mij) + βV (ωi, ω−i|mij)},
∑
k
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)(pi(ωi, ω′−i|mjk) + βV (ωi, ω′−i|mjk))

(7)
The first term inside the max operator is the firm’s choice of merger partner. For each
potential partner they evaluate the size of the buyout payment and post-merger profits and
continuation value. The second term is the expected value of not proposing a merger and
potentially seeing rival firms merge in the same period.
If firm i is not the proposing firm but is offered a buyout by firm j, they choose:
max{τij(ωi, ω−i),
∑
k
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)(pi(ωi, ω′−i|mjk) + βV (ωi, ω′−i|mjk))} (8)
3.2 Equilibrium
I will consider symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies (MPE) for this model.
If s ∈ S represents some element of the state space, a MPE consists of:
• A subset R ⊂ S;
• Strategies χ∗ for every s ∈ R, where χ∗ = (χE , χEX ,mij , τij , xi, xei) respectively
governing entry, exit, mergers, buyout offers, and investment.
• Expected discounted values conditional on these strategies, V E(Ω, cei), V (ωi, ω−i),
and VM (ωi, ω−i, i, j)∀j.
Such that:
1. The Markov process defined by any initial condition s0 and the strategies χ∗ has R
as a recurrent class.
2. For every s ∈ R, strategies are optimal given V E(·), V (·), and VM (·). That is, χ∗(Ω)
solves:
max
χE ,xei
V E(Ω, cei), max
χEX ,xi
V (ωi, ω−i), max
mij ,τij
VM (ωi, ω−i, , i, j)
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3. Values are consistent on R. For every Ω and Ω′ that are components of s ∈ R:
V (ωi, ω−i) = max{φ,max
xi
−FC−C(ωi, xi)+β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
VM (ωi+xi−η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)}
V E(Ω, cei) = max{0,−cei+Exei [maxxei{C(ωmax, xei)+β
∑
η
∑
ω−i
VM (xei−η, ω′−i)p(η)h(ω′−i|ω−i)}]}
VM (ωi, ω−i, i, j) =χ(ωi ≥ ωj) max
{
max
j
{−τij(ωi, ω−i)− cM + pi(ωi, ω−i|mij) + βV (ωi, ω−i|mij)},
∑
k
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)(pi(ωi, ω′−i|mjk) + βV (ωi, ω′−i|mjk))

+ χ(ωi < ωj) max{τij(ωi, ω−i),
∑
k
∑
j
Q(mjk|Ω)(pi(ωi, ω′−i|mjk) + βV (ωi, ω′−i|mjk))}
Computation:
To compute the model, I map the measure of product quality ω onto the integers
{0, ..., 10}. There is no limit on the number of firms allowed in the market although under
the parameters chosen there are never more than 4 firms active in equilibrium. Most prior
work in this literature caps the number of active firms at 2 for computational reasons. This
limitation is potentially costly, as it necessarily restricts attention to mergers to monopoly,
which are rarely allowed in practice. A binding cap could be thought of as imposing an
infinite entry cost at states with 2 firms in the industry, even if a third firm could profitably
operate.
The model is too complex to allow an analytic solution, instead, it is solved computa-
tionally using a modified version of the stochastic algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (2001).
The potential computational burden of the model described is enormous. The size of the
state space grows exponentially in the number of firms and potential good qualities, and
for each state, the integral over potential future states required to calculate the expected
discounted value of different actions involves probability distributions over the random se-
quence of merger proposers, synergy values, exit and entry behavior, and the outcomes of
investment. The computational burden of this high-dimensional integral and state space is
the reason there has been little work done on this type of analysis to date. The stochastic
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algorithm method substantially reduces this burden.
A detailed description of how the model is solved can be found in Appendix A. This
method solves the model asynchronously using the technique of reinforcement learning.
The model is simulated for a very high number of periods, with firms’ value functions
being updated with the observed results of their actions. Over time, the average of a firm’s
experiences becomes equal to its true expected value. The method offers several advantages.
The first is that equilibrium policy and value functions are only computed over a subset of
the state space. This subset, R ⊂ S, is the recurrent class of the Markov process formed by
equilibrium strategies. While the state space grows exponentially in the number of potential
firms, its possible for R to grow linearly or even not grow at all.
The other advantage is that by simulating the model rather than solving it directly, it
is not necessary to solve any high-dimensional integrals except once, in the limit. To briefly
describe the algorithm; for each visit to a state, firms solve the optimal policy based on their
estimate of the value function. Once they choose, pseudo-random numbers are drawn for any
stochastic component and the state is updated. The value function estimate at the original
state is then updated to include the profit realized and value at the new state. The process
then repeats at the new state. To improve performance, policy functions are randomly
perturbed in a small share of periods that slowly declines to zero.13 Periodically, a test of
the equilibrium conditions is conducted, this test is described in detail in Fershtman and
Pakes (2012). The algorithm performs well, converging to the same equilibrium outcome
from very different initializations of value of policy functions.
Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness An MPE for this model can be shown to exist
following Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010). For a discussion of potential multiplicity, see
Doraszelski and Pakes (2008). Generally, there is no way to fully rule out the possibility of
multiple equilibria or to find all possible equilibria, which poses a challenge for counterfactual
policy analysis. Given that multiple equilibria have been found to exist in similar models
without a merger stage, a more complex model also plausibly suffers from this problem.
Borkovsky et al. (2012) show multiplicity in a quality ladder model, although they conclude
that “the differences between equilibria tend to be small and may matter little in practice.”
13This prevents the algorithm from getting “stuck” in non-equilibrium values. It is referred to in the
machine learning literature as an epsilon-greedy or epsilon-decreasing strategy. More detail on how this is
implemented can be seen in Appendix A.
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While there is no way to completely rule out meaningfully different equilibria, I proceed
by exploring the parameter space along many different dimensions and following a Simple
Continuation Method as suggested by Judd (1998). In this procedure, I vary a parame-
ter of the model and trace out how equilibrium outcomes change as the parameter value
changes. In each case I initialize the model at the equilibrium value function found at the
last parameter value. I then repeat the process in the opposite direction and trace out
the set of equilibrium outcomes that results. If there are meaningfully different equilibria
possible this procedure could hopefully find them and characterize them.14. I perform this
procedure using 5 different model parameters which are discussed in the following section.
In each case, the set of equilibrium outcomes that is traced out is presented visually for a
set of benchmark results. In none of these experiments did the model result in different
equilibrium outcomes as the parameter value was increased from those that resulted in the
opposite direction. This provides some evidence that there do not exist other meaningfully
different possible equilibria.
4 Results on Innovation and Mergers
The model is solved for MPE numerically with parameter values initially taken from Pakes
and McGuire (1994) with the addition of merger fixed costs set at .5 and merging firms
having equal bargaining power.15 The full set of parameters can be seen in Table 4.1. These
parameters form a benchmark case. In this section I first present results for this benchmark
case followed by extensive exploration of the parameter space with particular focus on entry
costs and the merger technology. In all cases results are computed from simulations of the
industry for 500,000 periods from the equilibrium’s recurrent class of states.16
4.1 Results in the Benchmark Case
Static Competition: Before presenting results of the full dynamic model, I explore the
static competition between firms. Figure 1 presents results on prices, profits and incremen-
14A similar procedure is followed by Borkovsky (2017) and Borkovsky et al. (2017).
15The empirical finance literature finds inconclusive results on the shares of a merger’s surplus going to
either party, but most work finds the shares roughly equal. See, for instance, Ahern (2012).
16Because I present results for the long term stationary distribution of industry outcomes, the starting
point of this simulation does not effect the results provided it is in the recurrent class. Unlike in other
dynamic industry models, such as Besanko et al. (2010), there is no distinction between the short term and
long term distribution of industry outcomes.
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Table 1: Base Parameterization
β .925
ω 10
FC .6
cM .5
ρb, ρs .5
δ .6
c .1
c 5
cg 15
φ 1
y 15
M 10
tal profit gains in duopoly markets. The results show the prices at each state for a focal firm
facing 3 different possible competitors, a high-quality competitor, a low-quality competitor,
and a medium-quality competitor. Prices and profits are the result of Nash-Bertrand com-
petition and are increasing smoothly in own-quality. Facing a higher quality competitor
causes a firm to charge lower prices even when they are in the lowest possible quality state.
The incremental profit gain is the increase in profits associated with a 1 unit increase
in product quality holding rival’s quality fixed. This gain is not monotonic but is inverse-U
shaped, with the highest gain in profits coming from an incremental gain that puts the focal
firm at a higher quality level than a close rival. When facing a low-quality rival, for instance,
the highest profit gain comes from increasing quality from 2 to 3 or 3 to 4, after which there
are diminishing returns. When the rival has state 5, the highest gain in profits comes from
increasing from 5 to 6 followed by 6 to 7. This same feature carries over to the firm’s value
function, where the largest incremental gain in firm value comes from separating themselves
from a close rival. This provides the largest incentives to invest and to complete a merger,
in order to escape a close rivalry.
Merger Outcomes: Next I explore some features of the equilibrium distribution of
mergers. In this benchmark case there are no merger synergies. Mergers therefore only
serve to eliminate a rival firm and do not contribute to the acquiring firm’s product quality
or directly contribute to innovation. In this case, greater than 90% of mergers include a
firm operating at the leading edge of the quality ladder and the dominant firm always acts
as the acquirer. In roughly 95% of cases, mergers reduce the number of active firms from 3
to 2 and in the other 5% they reduce the number of firms from 2 to 1.
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Figure 1:
Note: This figure shows the prices, profits, and incremental profits at each state in a duopoly as a function
of competitor state. Incremental profits represents the increase in profits associated with increasing
product quality by 1, holding rival’s quality fixed.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of acquired firms by product quality. This distribution
is bi-modal, with a peak at medium-low quality and a peak just below the leading firm
quality. Industry leading firms therefore use mergers both to eliminate both close rivals
and potential rivals who have reached a certain quality cutoff. It is notable that there are
very few acquisitions of truly nascent competitors who have only entered the industry at
the lowest quality level. That is, dominant firms do not reflexively buy out new entrants
but only acquire firms that have reached some minimum quality level. From the entrant’s
perspective, this provides additional incentive to invest and achieve the quality required to
potentially be acquired.
Figure 3 shows a three dimensional histogram of the state space just prior to mergers
when n = 3. The firm acting as acquirer in these mergers is almost always at the industry
frontier, so the figure shows the distribution of states of the smaller 2 firms in the market. It
provides additional insight on what is generating the pattern shown in Figure 2. Essentially,
it is the case that two smaller firms can co-exist with a firm operating at the industry frontier.
This co-existence is made possible by the option value of a potential acquisition. Firms in
the middle states are less likely to be acquired and it is unprofitable for 3 firms to exist
simultaneously with one in this middle position. Finally, when there are two large firms it is
profitable for a third small firm to exist because competition between them and the larger
firm is less direct and there remains the prospect of a buyout.
An important fact about mergers is that they are entirely harmful to consumers in the
short run. Because firms compete in prices and because there is horizontal differentiation
between products, in all cases where firms merge and synergies are set to 0 mergers reduce
consumer welfare. Consumers are harmed by the removal from the market of a product,
by the reduction in price competition that causes prices to increase on remaining products,
and by the lack of any offsetting cost efficiencies.17 In the next section results are shown
with positive synergies but even in these cases the vast majority of mergers harm consumer
welfare. This is not surprising, the model essentially stacks the deck against mergers that
benefit consumers in the short run in order to highlight the difference between the static
outcome and the long-term outcome.
Industry Outcomes: Table 3 summarizes the key equilibrium outcomes with the
17As noted by Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) and others, the way taste heterogeneity is represented in
logit style models means that reducing the number of products available reduces total consumer surplus,
even holding all else equal.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Acquired Firms
Note: This figure shows the distribution of firms acquired in mergers by product quality.
Figure 3: Distribution of Small Firms Prior to Mergers
Note: This figure shows the distribution of firms when n=3, just prior to a merger occuring. It shows the
states of the two firms other than the firm operating at the industry frontier, who is the acquiring firm in
almost all cases.
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Table 2: Buyout Cost
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 2.8
6 5.4
7 15.0
8 12.0 4.7 3.3 7.1 7.2 5.5
9 5.0 5.7 9.8 6.5 11.9 13.1 18.2 24.8
This table shows the average buyout amount arising in
equilibrium with buyer state shown in rows and seller
state shown in columns. No mergers occur in equilib-
rium with a buyer in state 4 or lower.
benchmark parameterization in two different settings: one in which no mergers are allowed
and one with no restrictions on mergers. In the benchmark case without firm acquisitions
shown in column 1, the industry forms a relatively stable duopoly with 1.9 firms active in
a period on average. When firms exit they are quickly replaced by a new entrant and entry
and exit take place in roughly 10% of periods. In most periods the duopoly takes the form of
a leader and a laggard on quality where the leading firm invests enough to typically maintain
its position. The rate of innovation is measured as the average amount by which investment
advances the industry past ωmax, effectively defining innovation as the rate at which the
industry’s technological frontier advances. In the no-merger duopoly outcome, innovation
occurs primarily when the laggard firm invests sufficiently to challenge the leading firm and
the leading firm responds by investing significantly to regain ground on their rival.
When mergers are allowed with no restrictions, they occur frequently, in roughly 16%
of periods. The most important result is that when mergers are allowed the rate of entry
increases substantially from only 11% of periods to roughly 27% of periods. One of the
results of this entry is that despite having mergers directly reduce competition, the result
is only slightly fewer firms in the market, on average. This decreases from 1.91 to 1.75 and
while the share of periods spent in monopoly grows substantially, mergers also increase the
share of periods with 3 firms active. The result is an industry spending roughly 9% of the
time with three firms and 34% of periods as a monopoly.
Figure 4 shows the industry dynamics following a merger. I simulate the model a large
number of times and track the outcomes that follow a merger. The figures show the average
over these simulations. We see that entering the period in which a merger occurs, the
number of active firms is close to 3. This falls to nearly 1 following the merger and recovers
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Figure 4: Industry Dynamics Following a Merger
Note: This figure shows how the industry reacts after a merger. In period 0 a merger occurs and the figures
show the number of active firms, total consumer surplus, and the average individual firm states following
the mergers. The bottom panel shows the average product quality for the 4 largest firms in the industry in
each period. In each case the figure depicts the average outcome over a large number of simulations.
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Figure 5: Entry Rates
Note: This figure shows the average rate of entry as a function of number of incumbent firms for the
equilibria with and without mergers. This is computed as the average across all market states that appear
in equilibrium across many simulations.
to the long-term average after 6-8 periods. Similarly, the merger dramatically lowers average
consumer surplus, cutting it in half from over 12 to roughly 6. This also recovers to the
long-term average in 6-8 periods. The bottom figure shows the average states of up to 4
firms. The leading firm is always at the technological frontier. The merger reduces the
average quality of the 2nd best firm, typically by eliminating it from the market altogether.
The main result of the benchmark comparison is that, despite the fact that mergers sub-
stantially reduce welfare in the short run, allowing mergers increases the average consumer
surplus in the industry and the rate of innovation substantially. The rate of innovation in-
creases from .35 to .82. In other words, the technological frontier advances by an average of
1 unit in 80% of periods as opposed to one third of periods. Consumers benefit in perpetuity
from an increase in the technological frontier and so the increase in the endogenous rate of
innovation dramatically increases long-term consumer welfare.
Preemptive Entry
Figure 5 shows that the rates of entry occurring for different numbers of incumbent
firms. When there is only one incumbent in the market, entry occurs 86% of the time in
the mergers equilibria. Entry occurs more rarely in the no-mergers equilibrium, regardless
of number of incumbent firms.
It is clear from Figure 5 that the additional entry generated in the mergers equilibrium
is not merely replacement entry after a merger reduces the number of firms below the stable
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Table 3: Comparison of equilibrium with and without mergers
No Mergers Mergers
Firm Characteristics
Mean number of firms 1.91 1.75
Mean firm quality 5.74 6.90
Share of periods with exit 10.7% 15.0%
Share of periods with entry 10.7% 27.2%
Share of periods with mergers 12.2%
Investment
Total investment 1.45 2.27
Rate of innovation .35 .82
Mean entrant investment 3.30 4.69
Mean investment by market leader 1.18 1.45
Surplus
Mean consumer surplus 7.75 10.02
Mean total profit 13.09 12.90
Firm Distribution
Share of periods in Monopoly 14% 34%
Share of periods in Duopoly 81% 56%
Share of periods with 3 firms 5% 9%
Share of periods with 4 firms 5e-4% 4e-3%
This table presents the results of a simulation of the indus-
try for 500,000 periods from the equilibrium’s recurrent class
of states. This is a sufficient number of simulation periods that
the results displayed do not vary over simulations and so no
standard deviations are presented alongside them. In the sim-
ulation, the outcomes shown are measured in each period and
the average is taken over periods. Total investment indicates
the average sum total of investment undertaken by all firms in
a period.
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duopoly number. This is because with mergers allowed, the average number of firms in
the market actually increases, and entry rates are higher even when 2 or 3 incumbents are
present, as shown in Figure 5. Entry rates are higher at every market state. While antitrust
economists have long known that entry can mitigate the anticompetitive effects of mergers,
and entry is discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for this reason, the argument
for entry here is distinct. The value created by entry is not about reducing market power
of large, post-merger incumbents, but instead the prospect of a future buyout is generating
new, additional entry that is increasing competition and innovation while also increasing
consumer surplus.
5 Exploration of Assumptions on Entry, Mergers and In-
vestment
In this section I explore the parameter space to see how results depend on entry costs, the
innovation ability of entrants and incumbents, the potential for merger synergies, and the
degree of horizontal product differentiation.
5.1 Entry Cost Distribution:
Entry costs are a central parameter of this model and a key feature of antitrust analysis.
Policymakers typically take a lenient approach to mergers that would otherwise present
consumers with static harm if entry is likely to occur rapidly following the merger. Figure 4
shows that in the benchmark case entry does occur relatively rapidly, reducing the harm to
consumers of the acquisition and removal of a firm from the market. But the long-term effect
of mergers in this case is not merely short-term harm alleviated by rapid entry. Instead, the
prospect of a lucrative buyout provides a powerful incentive to enter and invest, generating
greater competition and innovation and a higher steady state level of consumer welfare.
Because this is the central dynamic in the model, I first explore how this result depends on
the level of entry costs.
I vary average entry costs from low to high and trace out the average equilibrium out-
comes. In each case entry costs are still stochastic, drawn from a uniform distribution
around the average cost cE ± 2. Results are compiled for both the cases with and without
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mergers and are summarized in Figure 6. At the high end of entry costs, in the setting
without mergers the industry forms a stable duopoly with no entry or innovation. At the
low end entry occurs in roughly 50% of periods and innovation and consumer welfare are
high. Similarly, in the setting with mergers as entry costs increase the rate of entry falls
substantially, as does the rate of innovation and consumer welfare.
Comparing the two scenarios as entry costs rise illustrates the mechanism by which
mergers generate higher long-term consumer welfare. We see that when entry costs are low,
consumer welfare is higher with mergers allowed than with no mergers. This is driven by
the higher rate of entry and high innovation rate overcoming the fact that there are fewer
firms on average as a result of mergers. The difference in innovation and thus consumer
surplus is substantial.
As entry costs increase, the non-merger equilibrium forms a stable duopoly with neither
entry nor exit and no innovation. The mergers equilibrium also forms a stable outcome
as entry costs rise, but with a modest amount of entry by firms replacing those that have
been acquired by larger firms. This is merely replacement entry and very little innovation
occurs in this outcome. As result, consumers are harmed in the static sense by the merger
with no offsetting increase in entry and innovation, and so total consumer surplus is lower
than if mergers were not allowed. Thus for mergers to have beneficial long-term properties,
entry costs must be sufficiently low to allow for speculative or preemptive entry and the
subsequent competition and innovation that results.
5.2 Merger Synergies:
Next I consider the prospect of synergistic mergers. In the benchmark case mergers do not
generate any synergies or efficiencies. In the quality ladder model then, the combined firm
simply takes the product quality of the larger firm and the acquired firm ceases to exist. This
benefits the larger firm through lessened competition, but in practice the acquiring firm may
take components of the acquired firm’s product and incorporate it into a combined product
with higher quality. In this case the new product would have quality ω′ = ωB +σωS) where
S indicates seller, B indicates buyer, and σ is a parameter between 0 and 1 reflecting the
degree of synergy.
Discussion:
Having firms combine their products rather than continuing to produce both and simply
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Outcomes as Entry Costs Vary
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as average entry costs vary from low to high.
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adjusting prices is not how mergers are typically treated in the literature on competition
in Bertrand settings. This combination of product qualities can be thought of as repre-
senting the total utility consumers receive from a firm’s offerings, which reflect a bundle of
characteristics, and where σ represents the degree of overlap in these characteristics.
For example, a company in an online setting may offer a mobile app product that has
a number of map-based features including driving directions, links to online shopping, in-
formation on public transit options, information on specific business locations including
consumer reviews, pictures, and links, as well as varying degrees of integration with other
devices. If a new firm enters that offers one of these specific features that a large dominant
firm currently lacks, they may acquire the new entrant and integrate the new feature into
their existing product, increasing it’s quality while also eliminating a rival in the online
maps market.
A similar mechanism applies in some pharmaceutical mergers, a setting which has at-
tracted much interest with regards to the effects of these mergers on long term innovation.
For instance, when Merck bought Idenix in 2014 they stated that they planned to “combine
the drug with two of its own drugs that work by different mechanisms for a triple-drug reg-
imen that could potentially cure most types of hepatitus C in less than two months (Loftus
(2014)). Another setting to which this model applies is in online services where firms collect
data on consumers and sell this data to other interested parties. Acquiring a rival both
reduces the number of competitors and increases the quality of the acquiring firm’s product.
A recent merger of this sort is the Nielsen acquisition of Arbitron, in which the impact on
innovation incentives played an important role in the FTC’s decision.
An added benefit of this approach to modeling mergers is that it fits better within the
quality ladder setting, where firms and products are defined by their position in vertical
quality space. This is a more natural setting to study innovation and particularly the
relationship between competition and innovation, and has been used by Greenstein and
Ramey (1998), Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), Goettler and Gordon (2014), Acemoglu and
Cao (2015), and Borkovsky (2017), among others, for this purpose. Empirical work on
mergers and industry dynamics is more likely to take the form of a quality ladder as well.
In this case vertical considerations are more important than static horizontal ones like the
diversion ratio between firms and the pricing externality.18 While the product synergy
18An alternative approach would be to retain multiproduct firms using the method of Gowrisankaran
(1999b), although this would inevitably face an insurmountable computational limitation as firms continue
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approach used here sacrifices realism with respect to static horizontal features, it does so to
focus more on what is relevant to the study of long-term innovation.
Results:
I explore the role merger synergies has on equilibrium outcomes by varying σ in small
increments from 0 to 1 and re-solving for a new equilibrium at each point. The main
results are presented in Figure 7. As synergies increase, the rate of innovation increases
dramatically, and thus consumer surplus increases as well. This is possible because mergers
can generate additional innovation beyond that generated by firm investment. If two high
quality firms merge the new product may have a quality above the current technological
frontier. Thus the merger advances the frontier and generates innovation directly.
As merger synergies increase, it becomes increasingly common for a new entrant to enter
and immediately be bought out. This generates synergies and the merger surplus is split
between the incumbent and new entrant. Notably, as the degree of potential synergies
increases, this effect eventually flattens and as synergies approach 1 the rate of innovation
levels off. This implies that the process faces diminishing returns in σ and it is not necessary
for σ to be 1 for consumers to benefit from synergistic mergers. Even modest synergies can
provide significant long-term benefits to consumers through the increased innovation they
spur.
5.3 Entrant Product Quality:
Next I explore the assumption that entrants can enter at any point in the quality ladder. In
the benchmark specification there is no cap on the product quality of a new entrant, only
increasing entry costs prevent firms from joining the industry at an already high level. In
some settings, particularly those with complex technologies or network effects, this may be
unrealistic. I therefore compute equilibrium outcomes for different specifications in which
this assumption is tightened.
Let ωE represent the maximum quality attainable by an entrant. Above ωE entry costs
can be thought of as infinite. Figure 8 shows equilibrium outcomes as ωE increases from 1
up to ω, the highest possible quality. When there is no limit on entrant quality, we observe
the familiar outcome that the mergers equilibrium displays significantly higher innovation
and consumer surplus than the no merger equilibrium.
to merge over time adding more and more products to their portfolios.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Outcomes with Merger Synergies
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as merger synergies vary from 0 to 1. For each
value of σ a new equilibrium is computed and simulated from.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Outcomes as Potential Entrant Quality Varies
Note: This figure shows the main equilibrium outcomes as the maximum possible entrant quality varies
from low to high.
As the maximum possible entrant quality decreases, the gap in consumer surplus between
the two models decreases as well. At the point where an entrant can only enter at the lowest
possible quality, the non mergers equilibrium results in higher consumer welfare than the
mergers equilibrium. In this case, there is still more innovation with mergers but the level is
quite low and there is relatively little entry. The results in these figures can be interpreted
by viewing the firm distribution in Figure 3. Firms will prefer either to enter at a low state
or a relatively high state, with less value associated with middle states. We therefore see a
jump in entry rate and innovation rate when entrants have the ability to enter at states 6
and above.
The main result that mergers increase innovation and thus welfare therefore depends on
both relatively low entry costs and the ability of entrants to develop products with at least
middling quality. When new entrants can only enter the bottom of the quality ladder, the
static harm to consumers caused by the mergers cannot be outweighed by greater innovation.
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5.4 Incumbent Innovation Capacity
In the baseline model, firms are able to innovate to achieve any level of ω in any period.
Indeed, in rare circumstances when a firm receives a set of very low investment costs,
we do observe large changes in ω in a single period. This investment technology follows
Mermelstein et al. (2018) and is important because it is “merger neutral” in the sense that
it does not change the investment opportunities that are available in the market and avoids
mergers that mechanically reduce the industry’s technological possibility set and hence total
investment. While important, it may not be realistic for all industries. In some industries, it
is impossible regardless of investment costs to dramatically increase the quality of a product
quickly.
I examine the results after varying the amount of product innovation firms are capable
of from the baseline of no limit down to a limit of one incremental unit per period. Let I˜
represent this cap, such that ω′ − ω ≤ I˜, or equivalently ci =∞ for ω′ > ωi + I˜.
Results are presented in Table 4. We see that when firms can only advance by 1 in
each period, the previous results are reversed. There is essentially no innovation and long
run consumer welfare is lower with horizontal mergers than without. For middle levels
of innovation capacity, mergers produce slightly higher levels of innovation and welfare.
Finally, when there is no cap on innovation, the previous result is seen again, mergers create
the incentive for much higher innovation and long run consumer welfare.
Table 4: Innovation Capacity and Mergers
I˜ = 1 I˜ = 3 I˜ = 5 I˜ = 7 No Cap
NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M
Rate of Innovation 0 0 0 .05 .07 .11 .19 .35 .35 .81
Consumer Surplus 5.8 4.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.7 7.1 9.1 7.8 10.0
Each column shows the rates of innovation and long run average consumer surplus with mergers
and with no mergers.
5.5 Horizontal Product Differentiation
In this section, I examine the role of horizontal product differentiation. This can thought of
as an analogy to “contestability” in the sense of Shapiro (2010), meaning the degree to which
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firms who successfully innovate can capture higher market share as a result.19 To do so I
manipulate the scale of the individual level utility shock. This is represented by the param-
eter φ in the consumers utility function, the dispersion of the random component of utility.
When this parameter is high, preferences exhibit less heterogeneity, consumers agree more
on which product offers the highest utility and firms with higher product quality capture a
higher market share. When φ is low, preferences are more horizontally differentiated.
When horizontal product differentiation is low, a successful innovation translates into
a large increase in both market share and profits. When it is high, by contrast, there is
less reward to innovation because a larger share of utility comes from random or horizon-
tal components. In industries with a low degree of horizontal product differentiation, the
benchmark rate of innovation will naturally be higher because the vertical component of
utility and thus a product’s quality are valued more highly by consumers. But the relative
effects of mergers is potentially ambiguous. To resolve this, I compare equilibria with and
without mergers in industries with varying levels of horizontal product differentiation. The
results are shown in Table 5.
As horizontal product differentiation decreases the effects of mergers change dramat-
ically. When φ = 1.25, there is slightly higher innovation and consumer welfare in the
no-mergers equilibrium . When horizontal product differentiation decreases to φ = .75, the
rate of innovation and average consumer welfare are both substantially higher in the merg-
ers equilibrium then the no-mergers equilibrium. This result is somewhat counterintuitive,
because when horizontal product differentiation is higher, a higher share of the gains from
innovation come from business stealing. Merging firms should internalize this incentive and
invest less. Indeed, they do, investment by leading firms falls, relative to the no-mergers
case. But this effect is outweighed by a large increase in entry and innovation by new
entrants. The reason is that when horizontal product differentiation is low, monopoly is
relatively more valuable. The result is that the equilibrium buyout offer τ at the modal
merger state is 2.4 times higher when φ = .75 than when τ = 1.25.
19This is distinct from how the term contestable is used by Baumol et al. (1982) who used it to referred
to a market with frictionless reversible entry.
37
Table 5: Horizontal Product Differentiation and Innovation
φ = .75 φ = 1 φ = 1.15 φ = 1.25
NM M NM M NM M NM M
Rate of Innovation .51 .89 .35 .82 .33 .12 .12 0
Consumer Surplus 9.82 12.13 7.75 10.02 7.50 7.09 6.99 6.04
Leading Firm Investment 1.22 1.52 1.18 1.45 1.17 .60 .90 .78
Monopoly Profits 13.31 13.31 12.47 12.47 11.99 11.99 11.69 11.69
Each column shows the rates of innovation and long run average consumer surplus with mergers and
with no mergers.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The relationship between horizontal mergers and innovation is increasingly important but
poorly understood. Firm decisions to invest in improving product quality interact in many
ways with the ability to merge and acquire other firms. To examine these interactions
requires simultaneously modeling endogenous entry, investment behavior, and endogenous
mergers. In addition, firms must have a broad ability to innovate, the long-run rate of
innovation must be made endogenous, and the mergers technology must allow for a flexible
and rich pattern of mergers.
This paper develops a framework for studying these issues and a method for improving
computation of models of industry dynamics. The paper then shows that in a model with
these features, traditional horizontal mergers policy based on static welfare analysis may
be counterproductive in the long run. Even when mergers are practically designed to fail
a static consumer welfare test, the long term result when they are allowed is substantially
higher innovation and consumer welfare. The prospect of a windfall gain from a buyout
offer by the leading firm generates additional entry that otherwise would not occur. This is
possible even with a single dominant firm in an industry and does not require competition
among dominant firms to buyout nascent competitors. Furthermore, this is distinct from
the replacement entry post-merger discussed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Combined, these results give guidance to antitrust policymakers regarding when there
is a potential long run benefit of allowing mergers that are harmful to consumers in the
short run. First, it is necessary that entry costs or barriers to entry be low. This is a
distinct argument than the standard view of barriers to entry, however. Entry does not
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merely alleviate the harm to consumers caused by the merger, with an entrant lured into
the industry post-merger by the prospect of less competition and higher profits. Instead,
entrants invest and preemptively enter the industry partially due to the incentive provided
by the prospect of a lucrative buyout This entry then results in higher competition and
more innovation.
Second, a perhaps more limiting condition is that this dynamic is most likely to occur in
industries where innovation is occasionally rapid and disruptive. If entrants can only enter
with a very low quality product or if incumbents cannot make large advances in product
quality in a short time period, the additional innovation incentives generated by mergers
will no be able to outweigh the short-term harm to consumers they cause.
While the nature of innovation in an industry is a feature of underlying technology and
thus out of the scope of policy, it may be observable and therefore a useful factor for a
merger authority to consider. Similarly, the degree of horizontal product differentiation in
an industry is an important determinant of the innovation incentives generated by mergers.
To the extent that horizontal product differentiation is analogous to a broader notion of
contestability, policymakers may have tools at their disposal to promote this. A more
contestable market can be achieved by restricting the use of long-term contracts, bundling
requirements, and other practices that raise switching costs. In innovative industries this
policy may be more effective in promoting consumer welfare and innovation than strict
merger review.
While this paper’s main result effectively argues for leniency in horizontal merger review,
these result suggests greater attention should be paid by antitrust authorities to actions
taken by firms that raise entry barriers or decrease contestability.
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A Appendix A: Algorithm for solving the model
This appendix describes the algorithm used to solve for an equilibrium to the model de-
scribed in section 3. This builds on the work of Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Fershtman
and Pakes (2012) but adds a novel element from the reinforcement learning literature to
improve convergence properties. It has been noted that the basic stochastic algorithm of-
ten performs badly on convergence. Indeed, without the changes described below the basic
algorithm almost always fails to reach an equilibrium. Here I review some of the reasons
for this and how they can be fixed. For greater detail on the basic algorithm see Pakes and
McGuire (1994) and Fershtman and Pakes (2012).20
The algorithm proceeds iteratively, simulating the dynamic game using a stored value
function that firms use to generate policies regarding entry, exit, investment, and mergers.
20For another application, see also Asker et al. (2016).
43
At each step of this simulation, the value function is updated with the payoffs realized
for each action taken or not taken. The key components that are stored in memory are
the current state of the industry at each iteration k, called Ωk, the stored value functions
defining payoffs for each action at that state: W Ik (Ωk, xi), W
E
k (Ωk, xei), and W
M
k (Ωk, i, j),
and a counter that stores the number of prior visits to state Ωk to that point: hIk(Ωk, xi),
hEk (Ωk, xei), and h
M
k (Ωk, i, j). If h
I
k(Ωk, xi) = 0, W
I
k (Ωk, xi) is empty. When the state
(Ω, xi) is reached for the first time, W Ik (Ω, xi) is set to an initial value and updated from
there.
Profits pi(Ω) are computed oﬄine for all states. Each value function is initialized at some
level that I discuss in more detail below. The timing is as follows, at each iteration k:
1. At state Ωk draw from memory:W Ik (Ωk, xi), W
E
k (Ωk, xei), W
M
k (Ωk, i, j), h
I
k(Ωk, xi),
hEk (Ωk, xei), and h
M
k (Ωk, i, j).
2. For all incumbent firms i and for the potential entrant, draw investment costs c˜i
3. Incumbents solve:
max
xi
{−C(c˜i, xi) +W Ik (Ωk, xi)} (9)
and exits if the max of this term is less than zero.
Entrants solve:
max
xei
{−C(c˜i, xei) +WEk (Ωk, xei)}
and enter if the max of this term is greater than zero.
4. Randomly draw the industry-wide depreciation shock η.
5. Using η and the investment, entry and exit decisions of incumbents and the potential
entrant, update the market state from Ωk to Ω′k.
6. Begin the merger stage by drawing a random ordering of firms to act as merger pro-
posers.
7. Loop over all firms, for each solve for the best merger partner as maxjWMk ((Ω
′
k, i, j).
If the value of merging for both firms is higher than the option value of letting the
next firm in the merger order proceed, they agree to merge, τij is calculated, Ω′k is
updated to Ωk+1, and the merger stage ends. During this stage, Ωk+1 is necessarily
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rounded to the nearest integer value. Once a merger has occurred or all firms have
had a chance to propose, the stage ends.
8. Profits for all firms are calculated as pi(Ωk+1).
9. Stored value functions are updated as:
W Ik+1(Ωk, x
∗
i ) = α
I(Ωk)β[pi(ω
′
i)−FC +EW Ik (Ωk+1)] + (1−αI(Ωk))W Ik (Ωk, x∗i ) (10)
WEk+1(Ωk, xe
∗
i ) = α
E(Ωk)β[pi(ω
′
i)− FC + EW Ik (Ωk+1)] + (1− αE(Ωk))WEk (Ωk, xe∗i ))
(11)
If firm i is acquired by firm j:
WMk+1(Ω
′
k, i, j) = α
M (Ω′k, i, j)τij + (1− αM (Ω′k, i, j))WMk (Ω′k, i, j) (12)
If firm i acquires firm j:
WMk+1(Ω
′
k, i, j) = α
M (Ω′k, i, j)[EW Ik (Ωk+1)−τij ]+(1−αM (Ω′k, i, j))WMk (Ω′k, i, j) (13)
where αI(·), αE(·), and αM (·) are weighting functions to be described in detail below.
In addition, counters hIk·), hEk (·), and hMk (·) are incremented by 1.
10. Return to step 1 at state Ωk+1.
The algorithm is periodically paused to test for whether an equilibrium has been reached.
This test follows Fershtman and Pakes (2012) and checks whether the value functions are
consistent with equilibrium notions described in section 3.2. This simulates a sample path
of the model and keeps a separate memory of the distribution of outcomes reached at each
state on this sample path. The mean squared difference between these outcomes and the
value function stored in memory is used to calculate bias. This is done separately forW Ik (·),
WEk (·), and WMk (·) and the highest bias value of the three is compared to .001 to determine
if an equilibrium has been reached.
In most cases, this equilibrium calculation is taken inside a larger loop over possible
parameter values as part of the Simple Continuation Method. This method traces out the
equilibrium outcomes of the model as parameters vary. In this case, when an equilibrium
is reached the value functions W Ik (·), WEk (·), and WMk (·) are saved but the counters hIk·),
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hEk (·), and hMk (·) are returned to 1 and the weighting functions described below are similarly
updated
A key consideration in the algorithm is what function to use to weight realized payoffs in
iteration k and how much to weight the current estimate ofWk(·). One alternative would be
to simply use αI(·) = 1
hIk(Ωk)
, ie the number of previous visits to that state. This ultimately
would give value functions equal to the arithmetic mean of realized payoffs across all visits
to that state. One problem with this approach is that if the initialized value functions are
far from their true values, it could take a very long time for the algorithm to converge.
A second and more serious problem with the algorithm as described above is that for
discrete choices such as entry and exit, it can get “stuck” at a suboptimal choice. For exam-
ple, if the value functions for firm investment are set high in order to encourage exploration,
firms will initially invest large amounts and rarely exit. At the same time as they make
these choices, potential entrants are exploring entry strategies and updating their entry
value function with the realized outcomes. In the case where incumbents invest highly entry
is rarely profitable and so in certain states potential entrants may update all entry options
as having negative value. Once they have done so, entry will cease at those states and as
incumbent firms investment policies converge towards equilibrium the potential entrant will
have stopped testing entry even though it may be profitable to do so.
I solve this second problem by implementing a strategy from the reinforcement learning
literature known as -greedy exploration. In this case, firms will take what they perceive
as being the optimal action with probability 1−  and with probability  they will choose a
policy at random from their set of possible actions. The researcher sets the initial value of
 to encourage exploration and as the algorithm proceeds it declines slowly to 0. In states
in which firms take suboptimal policies as a result of this process, they learn and update
values for those policies but the other firms in the market do not update at those states.
This approach is simple but has the advantages that it ensures each action will be taken
a large number of times and that policies ultimately converge to the optimal ones. In
practice, without implementing this strategy the algorithm almost always converged to an
outcome where a suboptimal discrete choice was taken and which was strongly rejected as
an equilibrium outcome by the testing procedure. This would remain true regardless of how
long it ran. Even if this extreme case of non-convergence were not possible, it is highly likely
the -greedy exploration improves the speed to convergence of even a simple model.
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A.1 Computational details
Here I provide specific details on the implementation of the algorithm. For incumbent and
entrant value functions, I initialize the values above the level of discounted profits if the
state they entered were permanent. A high initialization is useful for ensuring firms explore
their strategy space early on. That is:
W I0 (Ω) =
1.1pi(Ω)
1− β . (14)
Merger value functions are set at a flat constant value of 5, which is high enough to encourage
exploration. For all policies,  is set initially at .1 and declines such that ′ = .9 every
200, 000 iterations.
The weighting functions used are:
αI(Ωk) =
1
min(hIk(Ωk, xi), h¯
I)
(15)
where h¯ is a cap on high hk(·) for weighting purposes. This effectively places more weight
on the more recent h¯ observations. In practice, h¯ begins at 100 and doubles every 1, 000, 000
iterations until it ceases to bind. In all cases, the test concluded that an algorithm had been
reached before at most 350 million iterations and in some cases much sooner.
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